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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATIE; OF UT'AH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GERTRUDE LOUISE RICHARDS, 
DECEASED 
CATHERINE R. HOWELL, 
CATHERINE S. CRESS and CHARLES 
RICHARD SCHNEIDER, 
Contestants and Respondents, 
-vs.-
JANET R. PARKER, 
Proponent and Appellant, 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8452 
Gertrude Louise Richards died testate in Salt Lake 
City on June 30, 1954. She left a will dated the 20th day 
of March, 1946, and a codicil dated June 25, 1954. Both 
instruments were offered for probate in connection with 
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a petition filed on July 2, 1954, by Walker Bank & Trust 
Company (Tr. 1-4). Catherine R. Howell, a niece of Miss 
Richards, Catherine S. Cress and Charles Richard 
Schneider, a grandniece and grandnephew respectively, 
filed objections to the probate of the codicil (Tr. 5-7). 
On August 4, 1954, the court admitted the will to probate, 
appointed Walker Bank & Trust Company as executor 
"without prejudice to the admission to probate of said 
purported codicil as the codicil to said will" and ordered 
that the hearing and trial of the issues with respect to 
the codicil be placed upon the trial calender of the court 
(Tr. 8-11). 
Janet R. Parker, the sole surviving sister of Miss 
Richards, the principal beneficiary under the codicil, 
filed her answer (Tr. 13-14) and \\Talker Bank & Trust 
Cornpany filed its reply (Tr. 18-19) to the objections 
1nade tQ the probate of the codicil. There was but one 
factual issue subn1itted to the jury through the medium 
of a special Yerdict ( Tr. 69). Six of the eight jurors 
ans\\·ered that )iiss Richards, at the time of making the 
codicil dated June 25, 1954, "·as not of sound and dis-
posing 1nind. Thereafter the clerk~s judgment was enter-
Pd on the verdict denying the codicil to probate (Tr. 70-
73). TJ1iR appeal is taken to reverse the finding and 
judgment. 
l\fiss Richards, seventy-eight years of age, was in 
the Holy Cros~ Hospital in Salt Lal{e City on the date 
o-f the codicil, undergoing treatment for diabetes and 
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other complications under the care of Dr. John J. Galli-
gan. Dr. Galligan testified that if Miss Richards was 
not in a state of diabetic coma or in a state of insulin 
shock it 'vas his opinion that she would know what she 
was doing with reference to her worldy affairs (Tr. 282-
283) ; that a person in diabetic coma or in insulin shock 
evidences a condition that would be startling to a layman 
and that a lay1nan could immediately detect the condition 
of shock or coma (T·r. 284). Dr. Galligan testified that 
if Miss Richards, on the 25th day of June, was suffering 
from diabetic acidosis or insulin shock she would be un-
conscious or bordering on unconsciousness and incapable 
physically of "transacting" any legal document "or 
\vhatever happened on that day", but if she was not in 
insulin shock or in diabetic coma she could function (Tr. 
285). 
Joseph S. Jones, an attorney at this Bar practicing 
since 1931 (Tr. 122), Oscar l(. Carlson, a Vice President 
of vV alker Bank & Trust Company, and Clair M. ~~Iorten­
sen, a Vice President and Trust Officer of the bank, were 
present at the time that Miss Richards executed the codi-
cil of June 25th. Mr. Jones and Mr. Carlson attested 
the document as subscribing witnesses (Exhibit C-2). 
~Ir. Carlson traced his employment with the bank back 
to 1920 (Tr. 123). Mr. Mortensen has been employed by 
the bank in the Trust Department for more than twenty-
five years ( Tr. 176). They all testified unequivocally 
as to Miss Richards' mental competency at the time of 
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the execution of the codicil, all to the effect that she had 
a full understanding of what she was doing and was of 
sound and disposing mind and memory (Tr. 104, 129, 
189). 
The subscribing witnesses related in minute detail 
all that occurred at the time the codicil was executed, 
including a conversation between Miss Richards and Mr. 
Jones concerning Judge Harold Stephens, :Jfiss Richards 
stating that Judge Stephens was the family lawyer for 
many years and inquiring concerning :Jir. Jones' ac-
quaintanceship with him and as to Judge Stephens' health 
(Tr. 98). l\{r. Carlson had known ~Iiss Richards for 
about twenty-five years as a business customer of the 
bank and particularly of the investment department, the 
department in ,,~hich Mr. Carlson functioned (Tr. 154). 
Mr. :Thiortensen had assisted ~fiss Richards in connection 
with her tax returns (Exhibit P-4). 
Even l\I r~. Ho,vell, one of the eontestants, a niece of 
both !fiss Richards and Mrs. Parker, testified that she 
Ina de no reflection on l\Iiss Richards' In ental integrity; 
that she assumed that Miss Richards was transacting 
business up until the last and that she assumed that Miss 
Richards could take care of her affairs (Tr. 411-412). 
The unc('~:liYocal testin1onY of the bank\;;: officers and the 
- 1 • 
bank's attorney "Ti th respect to lfiss Richards' business 
coinprt<.~ne~T is eorroborated by a revie"\Y of the inventoried 
as8ets of the estate ( Tr. 20-35), "\Yhich inventory discloses 
a rare aeeun1ulation of iteins such as are possessed by a 
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family of long standing, of means and an appreciation 
of esthetic values (Tr. 402) as well as investments gen-
erally looked upon as being those held by a prudent and 
conservative investor. 
On the 25th of June, during the time that Mr. Jones 
was explaining the codicil to Miss Richards and before 
~Iiss Richards had affixed her signature thereto, the 
conference was interrupted by the interne (Dr. Cope-
land), who came into the hospital roo1n and said: "I 
have son1ething to attend to with Miss Richards, and I 
'rould like you to leave the room." Miss Richards said: 
"I have some important business with these gentlemen. 
I \vish that you could do that later, and I could proceed 
'vith this business." Dr. Copeland replied: "No, if you 
want to get well, you have got to do what I ask you to do, 
and I want you to do it now." The Doctor said: "She will 
be fixed up in a few minutes, and you can come back." 
(Tr. 100-101). When the three men returned to the room, 
about t'venty minutes later, Miss Richards was sitting 
up in bed and was being fed intravenously through a 
tube, similar to Exhibit C-1, affixed to her right wrist. 
~rr. Jones, when he saw the tube in Miss Richards' right 
\vrist, said: "Well, now, we can come back and attend 
to this after * * * you have this feeding or whatever you 
are receiving." 1fiss Richards said: "No, I don't want 
you to come back later. I want to do this right now." (Tr. 
101). Whereupon the statements with regard to the 
codicil were reiterated and the mechanics of signing the 
codicil and the due attestation thereof were followed 
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through, Miss Richards taking some three or four minutes 
to read the document and then signing it as best she could 
with the intravenous apparatus attached to her right 
wrist, the hand with which she signed her name (Tr. 101-
102) strapped with boards so the needle would not be 
ejected from the vessel (Tr. 287). ~Iiss Richards was 
concerned about the signature and said: "Is that a good 
enough signature~" Mr. Jones assured her that it was 
(Tr. 102). 
The 1946 will, after making specific bequests to three 
nephews, the sons of Mrs. Parker, to Mrs. Howell, to 
Eleanor Richards Schneider, to :\Irs. Parker (including 
the home) and to a friend, gives, by paragraph 11, one-
half of the residue to nirs. Parker, and the other half to 
Mrs. Howell and Eleanor Richards Schneider, the only 
children of l\fiss Richards' deceased brother, Charles 
Edward Richards. Mrs. Parker was appointed executrix. 
The codicil of June 25, 1954, recites the death of Eleanor 
Richards Schneider and cancels paragraph 8 of the will 
'vhich gave to Mrs. Schneider certain specific items. The 
codicil revokes the residuary bequests contained in para-
graph 11 and in lieu thereof provides for a payment of 
$10,000.00 to 1\frs. Howell and $10,000.00 to the children 
of l\[rs. Schneider, to be divided equally among them 
( Catherille ~3. Cress and Charles Richard Schneider). 
The residue of the estate then goes to ~Irs. Parker. The 
appointment of 1\Irs. Parker as execu'trix is revoked and 
Walker Bank '-~ Trust Company is made executor. As 
to the latter 1\liss Richards stated to ~fr. Carlson that, 
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while she had originally appointed Mrs. Parker to act as 
executrix, she considered this an honorary' appointment 
and because of the vvork to be done in connection with 
her affairs she would like to have the bank act as exe-
cutor (Tr. 133). 
There was some confusion at the bank and with its 
attorneys before the June 25th document was finally 
drafted in accordance with the instructions of Miss 
Richards. The confusion was brought about by the fact 
that the bank did not have the 1946 will and, as a result 
of the confusion, Miss Richards signed a document on 
June 22nd purporting to be a codicil but which document 
\vas later destroyed as hereinafter mentioned and after 
the bank secured a copy of the 1946 will. Mr. Carlson 
had been instructed by Miss Richards on June 21, 1954 
(Tr. 130) to prepare a codicil for Miss Richards' signa-
ture, giving to Mrs. Howell only $10,000.00 and only 
$10,000.00 to the children of Eleanor Schneider ( Tr. 349) 
and providing for the bank to act as executor in lieu of 
her sister, Mrs. Parker. Miss Richards stated that she 
had made "a terrible mistake" in her will (Tr. 133). Mr. 
Carlson, without having seen the will of March 20, 1946 
(Tr. 136) or knovving the provisions thereof, or that Mrs. 
Parker, Mrs. Howell or the children of Eleanor Schneider 
were or were not named in the will, and under the ad-
monition of l\1iss Richards to keep her desires confiden-
tial, particularly with respect to Mrs. Parker ( Tr. 154-
155), initiated a course of procedure in the bank through 
the medium of Wm. J. Fitzpatrick (Tr. 134-135), the 
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Trust Officer, which resulted in Mr. Carlson and 1\Ir. 
Athol Rawlins, an attorney for the bank, taking an in-
strument to Miss Richards for her signature on the 22nd 
day of June (Tr. 136). 
On the completion of the June 22nd instrument, Mr. 
Rawlins and Mr. Carlson took the document to Miss 
Richards' hospital room where she duly executed the 
same with Mr. Rawlins and ~Ir. Carlson signing as the 
attesting witnesses (Tr. 344-346). The June 22nd instru-
ment was destroyed on June 26, 1954, by Mr. Carlson in 
Miss Richards' presence and at her direction (Tr. 152-
153). 
On June 23rd or during the morning of the 24th 
nir. :\fortensen informed )ir. Rawlins that he had re-
ceived a copy of :\Iiss Richards' will from Mrs. Parker 
and that a mistake had been made in the codicil of the 
22nd ( Tr. 204, 3-±9) . The effect of the codicil of the 
22nd, "-hich did not contain any referenee to the residue 
of the estate (Tr. 361), "\Yas to increase, contrary to Miss 
Richards' instructions, the bequests to l\Irs. Howell and 
to the children of )Irs. Schneider (Tr. 350). l\Ir. Mor-
tensen then handed a forn1 of codicil to l\Ir. Rawlins 
\\Thich 1nade reference to the "-ill of !larch 20, 1946 (Tr. 
350). rri12l'<?"llpon ::\fr. Ra"\Ylins took the draft and made 
son1e corrections ( Tr. 351). This 'vas essentially the 
~a1110 as the June 25th docu1uent (Tr. 352). ~Ir. Raw·lins 
and 1\f r. Carlson took the new instrun1ent to the hospital 
on June 24th (Tr. 352), explained to Miss ~ichards that 
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a mistake had been 1nade in the codicil executed the pre-
vious Tuesday (June 22nd) and explained the provisions 
of the new document ( Tr. 353-354). 
Mr. Rawlins could get no response from Miss Rich-
ards when he asked her to close her fingers on the pen 
that he attempted to get her to hold for the purpose of 
signing the document, and concluded that she did not 
kno\v what he \vas telling her when he said: "Close your 
fingers." (Tr. 356). Mr. Rawlins thought that Miss 
Richards' condition was temporary and due to some-
thing that had happened that morning, particularly a 
bath that she was having when he first appeared (Tr. 
359). I\1r. Rawlins and Mr. Carlson then left the hospital 
but before leaving they asked the nurse to call the bank 
w·hen Miss Richards felt better, the nurse stating that 
1\Iiss Richards usually felt better in the afternoon (Tr. 
357). 
The next day, at the time of the execution of the 
June 25th codicil, 1"Ir. Jones asked Miss Richards if she 
desired all of the residue of her property to go to Mrs. 
Parker and 11iss Richards answered "Yes." (Tr. 186). 
On June 26th, when the June 22nd instrument -vvas de-
stroyed, Miss Richards was "very" alert and seemed 
"quite relaxed." (Tr. 161). She talked about the disposi-
tion of the first codicil and about Mr. Carlson's family 
and his -vvife's health. She expressed the feeling that she 
was very glad that her business had been concluded. "I 
feel much better now, and I can feel more peaceful." (Tr. 
162-163). 
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Miss Richards, during her stay in the hospital, was 
suffering, in addition to diabetes, from a chronic heart 
disease (Tr. 227), a physical "senility" (Tr. 230) and 
hardening of the arteries "as we would expect in almost 
anyone her age" (Tr. 228). Dr. Copeland, an interne at 
Holy Cross caring for Miss Richards under Dr. Galli-
gan's direction, testified that when he first saw Miss 
Richards she was rational, in contact with reality, orient-
ed as to time, person and place, knew where she was, 
the approximate time of day and knew what she was in 
the hospital for (Tr. 229-230). Dr. Copeland also testi-
fied that when he injected the needle into Miss Richards' 
wrist for the intravenous feeding on June 25th niiss 
Richards was oriented, was not in insulin shock or in a 
diabetic coma (Tr. 257-258). 
Dr. L. M. Currier, a physician specializing in psychi-
atry (Tr. 306), was pern1itted, over objections, to testify 
hypothetically to the effect that an enlarged heart is an 
inefficient heart; that "one would expect that it might 
have some influence on the clarity of thinking" (Tr. 313) ; 
that he "would expect" that a person between diabetic 
acidosis and insulin shock would probably be in some 
state of confusion and perhaps disorientation "at least 
some of the ti1ne." (Tr. 318). He testified that it would 
see1n ''hig·hly unlikely· that a person in this 1uedical situa-
tion 'vould be in a state of Inind to n1ake any decision of 
lasting- or serious iinportance." (Tr. 319). Among other 
th i.ngs, and over objection, Dr. (~urrier "~as pernritted to 
injeet. n 11 acadeinic definition of usenility~' as applying 
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to a mental condition ( Tr. 308-309) in direct contradic-
tion of contestants' own witness, Dr. Copeland, who testi-
fied that he used the term "senility" to imply the failing 
of physical condition generally (Tr. 230). 
The hypothetical questions propounded to Dr. Cur-
rier were objected to on the grounds, among others, that 
they misstated and distorted the record and that there 
was no proper foundation (Tr. 317). Motions were made 
to strike based upon the grounds that the testimony had 
no probative value and stated merely conjecture, uncer-
tainty and speculation (Tr. 319). Dr. Currier speculated 
upon Miss Richards' mental condition without having 
seen or treated her ( Tr. 334-335) and indulged in suppo-
sitions not warranted by the record and not limited to 
the situation as it existed when the codicil was executed 
by Miss Richards on June 25th. Dr. Currier's testimony 
is challenged by this appeal. 
The case was submitted to the jury without any 
instruction whatsoever as to the burden of proof. Over 
objection (Tr. 424) the contestants were permitted the 
right to open and close the argument to the jury, and the 
absence of an instruction as to who had the burden of 
proof was made a matter of exception to the court's in-
structions (Tr. 434-435). 
\Vhile the amended pretrial order stated three fac-
tual issues to be determined, (1) whether Miss Richards 
signed the codicil, ( 2) whether Miss Richards had the 
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requisite capacity to make the codicil, assuming that she 
signed it, and (3) whether the codicil executed by Miss 
Richards was of her own free will or was in fact executed 
because of undue influence exercised upon her by Janet 
R. Parker (Tr. 15-17), the court submitted only the sec-
ond is sue to the jury. 
Upon this appeal it is contended that there is no 
competent evidence in the record to support the finding 
to the effect that Miss Richards did not have the requi-
site testamentary capacity to execute the codicil, but that 
on the contrary the evidence affirmatively shows, without 
contradiction, that ~!iss Richards "\Yas competent to make 
the codicil of June 25, 1954. 
STATE:JIEKT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE HEARSAY AND NO 
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSI-
BILITY. 
POINT 2. 
DR. CURRIER WAS PERMITTED OVER OBJECTION 
AND WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO STATE 
THAT MISS RI·CHARDS WAS AFFLICTED WITH A MEN-
TAL "SENILITYn. 
POINT 3. 
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. CURRIER CONSISTED OF 
MERE ABSTRACTIONS. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUES-
TIONS PROPOUNDED TO Hil\I WERE NOT BASED ON THE 
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STATE OF MISS RICHARDS' PHYSICAL OR MENTAL 
HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE 
CODICIL AND THE EVIDENCE SO ADDUCED SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN. 
POINT 4. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER WAS 
UNDULY RESTRICTED. 
POINT 5. 
THE CONTESTANTS HAD THE BURDEN TO SHOW 
INCOMPETENCY AND THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SO INSTRUCTED. 
POINT 6 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S FINDING. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
ADMITTED THE CODICIL TO PROBATE NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT. 
ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT 1. 
THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE HEARSAY AND NO 
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSI-
BILITY. 
The hospital records, Exhibit C-3, were received in 
evidence over objection ( Tr. 262). The records were 
identified by 11iss \ 7 an Alstine, the medical record 
librarian, who was permitted to say that they were kept 
in the ordinary course of business in the hospital (Tr. 
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210-211), but on a voir dire examination the witness 
testified that the file was made up from a number of 
different sources with markings of nurses and trainees 
who the witness had no way of knowing as being pre-
sently at the hospital or who were even graduate nurses 
(Tr. 213-214). The witness also testified that others 
than graduate nurses had access to the file and that she 
had no way of knowing whether anyone would be quali-
fied to say what the instrument or the document pur-
ported to say (Tr. 214); that as custodian she did not 
have anything to do with the file until after Miss 
Richards' death (Tr. 218-219). 
In the absence of statute the general rule is that 
hospital records are not admissible in evidence as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. See W·ignz.ore on Evidence, 
3rd Edition, ';r ol. ''I, Section 1707. "rigmore criticizes 
the rule but, nevertheless, says : ~'K o Court seems yet 
to have sanctioned such an exception on common law 
principles." 
We are not unmindful of the expressions of this 
Court in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, 96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 120 _.A .• L.R. 1117, and 
the annotation which follo\\"'S on page 1124 of 120 A.L.R. 
The question in the Clayton case "Tas w·hether the respon-
dent had a diseased appendix at the time of the accident 
and, if so, did the disease contribute to the disability 
and bar recovery. The appellant in the case assigned 
as error the refusal to adn1it in evidence the hospital 
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records which were identified only by Dr. Albaugh, the 
attending physician. This Court did not find error in 
the refusal to receive the hospital records. After calling 
attention to the efforts made to identify the record, 
the Court said : 
"None of the cases *** cited as supporting 
admissibility of hospital records go so far as 
appellant would have us go in this case. Before 
such records can be admitted, in the absence of a 
statute, the offering party must show the neces-
sity of admitting the records without requiring 
the person or several persons who made the 
records to testify. He must then show the custody 
from which the records were taken and that they 
vvere prepared in the due course of hospital work.'' 
The suggestion fron1 the above quotation to the effect 
that hospital records might be admissible upon a 
showing that they were kept in due course of hospital 
work is, we believe, dictum. The Clayton case is cited 
in State v. Davie, ____________ u tah ____________ , 240 P. 2d 263, but 
only to call attention to the cases cited therein, the Davie 
case having to do with records of a telephone company, 
a power and light company and an insurance agent, 
which records were permitted under the "shop book" 
and "regular entry" rules. 
We do not believe that this Court has directly held 
hospital records to be admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. The Court in the Clayton case said: 
"This seems an appropriate subject for legis-
lative consideration, but in the silence of our 
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legislature common law principles must be ap-
plied." 
In the instant case the trial court withheld its ruling 
on the exhibit (Tr. 222) and perfunctorily admitted the 
exhibit on the cross-examination of Dr. Copeland. 
"Q. Does your chart indicate that Miss Richards 
was given sedation on the 25th of June~ 
A. It \Vould be in the nurses' notes, which we 
have. 
:)(:: * :)(:: 
Q. Is there any sedation~ 
A. I can refer to them and let ~~ou kno\Y. At what 
time~ Any time during the 25th. 
Q. Any time during the 25th. 
THE COURT: Since the "Witness is about 
to testify, not from his memory but from the 
exhibit, I suppose I ought to rule on that 
offer, and the exhibit "\\ill be received in evi-
dence. That is Exhibit C-3. 
MR. GUSTIN: Does it show it is re-
ceived over our objection~ 
THE COURT: Yes. 
A. In the n1orning. See, this starts at 1nidnight. 
At t\\ ... 0 A.:JI. in the 1norning she received 
sodiun1 lu1ninaL \Yhich is a sedatiYe. 
Q. (By Mr. Gustin) Is that the business that I 
might call,a sleeping pill f 
A. This ~ grain~ of llnninal 'Yould not be as 
strong as the usual sleeping pill that you 
r(\fer to, but it is definitely a sedative." (Tr. 
262). 
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Dr. Copeland on his direct exan1ination was per-
mitted to refresh his recollection fron1 various pages of 
Exhibit C-3, particularly 17 through 23 (Tr. 229-240). 
The question asked Dr. Copeland concerning the seda-
tives that 1fiss Richards had received at 2 :00 A.M. on the 
morning of June 25th was proper cross-examination 
regardless of the source of the Doctor's knowledge of 
the sedation, because he testified that when he made 
his progress report as of 8 :00 or 9 :00 o'clock in the 
morning of June 25th he noted "a stuperous condition" 
(Tr. 258). It is submitted that the cross-examination on 
the question of sedation did not waive the objection to 
the hospital reoords, nor did it further identify the same 
for their admissibility in evidence. So the question re-
mains whether the hospital records are admissible and, 
if so, whether a proper foundation has been laid. The 
entire file C-3 went before the jury without being 
authenticated except as to possible signatures of Dr. 
Galligan and Dr. Copeland. The prejudical effect of 
improper hospital records is obvious and, in fact, is ruled 
to be so by the cases cited in 120 A.L.R. 1136, an annota-
tion following the Clayton case. 
POINT 2. 
DR. CURRIER WAS PERMITTED OVER OBJECTION 
AND WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO ST'ATE 
THAT MISS RI·CHARDS WAS AFFLICTED WITH A MEN-
TAL "SENILITY''. 
Page 2 of Exhibit C-3 is in the handwriting of Dr. 
Copeland (Tr. 224) and purports to be a case history of 
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Miss Richards written upon her admission to the hospital 
on May 21, 1954. On this page appears the expression: 
"She is senile and difficult to manage on out patient 
basis." Dr. Copeland testified: 
"A. We don't find anything with respect to senil-
ity on examination. That is just an observa-
tion. I use the term, 'senility,' to imply old 
age and failing of physical condition gen-
erally. This has a connotation of both phy-
sical and mental senility. In this regard I 
meant to imply from the word 'senile' just 
failure of her physical being." (Tr. 230). 
Dr. Currier, the phychiatrist, over objection, was per-
mitted to inject the following: 
"Q. Doctor Currier, will you tell us "~hat senility 
means? 
MR. Gl~STIX: :Now, if the Court please, 
that "~as gone into yesterday "ith counsel's 
own "~·itness. He couldn~t impeach that ,,-it-
ness, Doctor Copeland. 
1fR. BAGLEY: I have no intention of 
impeaching the-attempting to. 
THE COURT: I think he may have this 
'vitness to explain it if he 'vishes and I sup-
pose \vouldn't be bound. If he thought the 
testimonv of so1nebodv else "~asn't the truth, 
he could give additional testimony. He 
couldn't impeach to sho'"" that witness "Tas 
nn,vorth~~ of belief, but I think he can offer 
Pvidenee. That objection-
1tR. G1TSTIX: ''re 1nake the further 
objeetion, Your Honor~ that it isn't-it doesn't 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
tend to prove nor disprove anything in this 
case. It isn't directed to any issue in this 
case. It is a generalized statement. It is 
theory. We might be here a long time listen-
ing to this kind of discourse. The question 
is not directed to anything having to do with 
Miss Richards. 
THE COURT: There is some testimony 
that the word was used. The doctor who 
wrote the word explained the meaning for 
it, but I will let the witness answer. I'm not 
sure just "\vhat counsel is after. Go ahead and 
tell what senility is, Doctor. 
A. All right, sir. Senility is a mental condition 
which is characteristic of the latter decades 
of life-we usually say people between sixty 
and eighty years of age-which is character-
ized by intellectual deterioration, that is, loss 
in thinking and reasoning power, with par-
ticular reference to losses of recent memory 
and with frequently various states of con-
fusion. 
* * * 
1\tiR. GUSTIN: We move to strike the 
statement .of the witness to this time in 
answer to the last question on the ground 
that it is wliolly immaterial and irrelevant 
to any issue in this case ; and we call Your 
Honor's attention to the fact that Doctor 
Copeland, who knew Miss Richards and who 
examined her, testified to a physical and not 
a mental senility. 
THE COURT : The motion is denied. 
You may go ahead, Mr. Bagley." (Tr. 307-
309). 
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Dr. Currier was permitted to inject the idea of intel-
lectual deterioration, loss in thinking and reasoning 
power and losses of recent memory without having seen 
Miss Richards (Tr. 334). Currier was able to cloud the 
issue without any observation or objective finding of 
his own. It is difficult to conceive of a more damaging 
statement in the presence of a jury on the issue of 
mental competency of the deceased. Dr. Currier could 
not be cross-examined on an academic definition of a 
term. The assertion of mental senility was wholly dis-
connected with ~1iss Richards as a personality and yet 
to a jury it had the sanction of the court as a meaning-
ful statement of evidentiary value as applied to the 
factual inquiry. 
The trial court recklessly permitted Dr. Currier's 
abstractions notwithstanding Dr. Copeland's positive 
testilnony as to hoY\T he used the term ,,-hen he wrote it, 
and notwithstanding the fact that the court's attention 
was directly called to Dr. Copeland ~s testin1ony that he 
'vas testifying to a matter of physical and not a mental 
senility. It is conceivable that a physciatrist eould testify 
as to his own observation, haYing seen and examined 
the patient, hut it i~ inconceiy·able, under even the most 
libPral of judicial inquiries, that one~ "\Yhether he be a 
p~yehiatrist or not, could ilnpose upon the trier of the 
fnet a 1neaning of a "-ord that the person using it did 
not in tend and a connotation that "\Yas expressly dis-
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claimed when the word was used. Dr. Copeland and Dr. 
Currier were both called as witnesses for the contes-
tants. 
Dr. Currier reflected upon the integrity of Dr. 
Copeland's testimony and at the same time made a vi-
cious and unwarranted statement not supported by any-
thing in the record, and which the court refused to strike 
after being advised of the full purport of the same. The 
situation with Dr. Currier goes beyond the impeachment 
and contradiction of Dr.· Copeland. It stands out as a 
brazen ~isregard of the record and as holding out to a 
I jury as worthy of its consideration the theories, specula-
tion and abstractions of a phychiatrist on the state of 
mind of an individual who he, the psychiatrist, has never 
seen or treated. If this conduct is to be condoned it 
opens up a new field for psychiatric speculation in the 
trial of cases. 
Dr. Currier was not asked to express his opinion on 
anything that Miss Richards was alleged to have said 
or to have done. He was permitted, by mere assertion, 
to impute to her a state of mental senility. The inter-
rogation, withhout any reference to any alleged factual 
premise, started with the bold question: "Dr. Currier, 
·will you tell us what senility means~" Dr. Copeland had 
already told the jury the meaning of the term "senility" 
as he used it; that he meant it "as failure of her physical 
being" and that the expression was the result of his own 
observation or opinion. Dr. Currier was permitted to 
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indelibly stamp 1\Iiss Richards, in the minds of the jury, 
with the odium of mental senility by a distortion of the 
observation made by Dr. Copeland and in direct con-
tradiction to the term "senility" as Dr. Copeland used 
it. The prejudical effect of this one facet of Dr. Currier's 
testimony is readily apparent. 
In McMinis v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (Pa.), 
135 A. 722, it is said: 
"A medical expert may testify as to the 
symptoms and sensations narrated by the patient, 
for the purpose of securing a correct diagnosis 
(Eby v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525, 102 A. 
209; Boyle v. P.R. T. Co., 286 Pa. 537, 134 A. 446), 
and is permitted to give his professional judg-
ment as to effects produced by an accident, based 
on his o"rn physical examination of the injured 
party (Brown v. Chester Traction Co., 230 Pa. 
498, 79 .A ..• 713), but not on 'vhat others have told 
hi1n, even though fully advised as to the history 
of the ease ( "\Yillian1s v. P. R. T. Co., :257 Pa. 354, 
101 A. 7 48; Becker v. P. R. T. Co., 2±5 Pa. 462, 
91 A. 861). The 'ritness cannot found his opinion 
1nerely- on facts communicated, and the state-
lnents heard in court. Ho"~arth v. Adams Express 
(~o., 269 Pa. 2SO, 112 ~-\.. 536. If he has listened 
to all of the evidence submitted to the jury, where 
not conflicting, he Ina~~ express his judgn1ent. Gill-
man v. Media Ry., 224 Pa. 267, 73 A. 342; Coyle 
v. Coininon"'"ealth, 104 Pa. 117. He is not compe-
trnt, ho,Yever, to give an opinion based only on a 
part of the n1aterial evidence adduced, as attenlpt-
Pd lH_\rP, though he nu1~~ be asked as to his con-
clusion from consideration of specifically defined 
portions of the testhnony offered. :\IeDyer v. 
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Eastern Pa. Ry., 227 Pa. 641, 76 A. 841. The opin-
ion desired should have been elicited by asking a 
proper hypothetical question. Rouch v. Zehring, 
59 Pa. 7 4; Hoy's Estate, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 512. 
In any event, where the judgment is to be based 
on the testin1ony of others, the query must assume 
the truth of the facts as narrated, before an opin-
ion can be given. Williams v. P.R. T. Co., supra; 
Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395; 1 A. 765; 
Wissinger v. Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa. 
566, 115 A. 880; Howarth v. Adams Express Co., 
supra. The expert in this case was not asked to 
form his judgment on a defined part of the evi-
dence, nor to assume the truth of that portion 
which he did hear. Under the circumstances dis-
closed, his opinion as to causal connection should 
therefore have been rejected, and its admission 
was prejudicial error, which makes necessary the 
sustaining of the fourth and fifth assignments of 
error." 
Dr. Copeland made his note \vith reference to senil-
ity on page 2 of Exhibit C-3, the case history of Miss 
Richards, upon her arrival at the hospital. He testified, 
nevertheless, that when Miss Richards was admitted to 
the hospital she was rational, in contact with reality, 
oriented as to ti1ne, person and place, knew where she 
was, the approximate time of day and knew what she 
was in the hospital for ( Tr. 229-230), a condition cor-
roborated by Messers. Jones, Carlson and Mortensen at 
the tin1e the codicil of June 25th was executed. Dr. 
Galligan, the attending physician, testified that Miss 
Richards was competent when not in a diabetic coma or 
insulin shock, that she knew what she was doing with 
reference to her worldly affairs (Tr. 282-283) and: 
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"Q. As to the competency, Doctor, state what your 
opinion was. 
A. Well, ~f I may generalize, I believe a person 
is competent if they are conscious and know 
the difference between right and wrong. I 
think if their memory is unquestioned, if 
they have the power of decision, that they 
have definitive action in anything they do, 
and also the evidence of will power, to make 
decisions, (sic) that (sic) I thought ~Iiss 
Richards had, except during the periods when 
she was either going into coma or in insulin 
shock." (Tr. 284). 
There is nothing in the record from w·hich Dr. Cur-
rier can justify the conclusion of mental senility in the 
sense that ~\I iss Richards had suffered intellectual 
deterioration or a loss in thinking and reasoning power 
sufficient to reflect upon testan1entary capacity. 
POIXT 3. 
THE TESTil\.IONY OF DR. CURRIER CONSISTED OF 
MERE ABSTRACTIONS. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUES-
TIONS PROPOUNDED TO HIM WERE NOT BASED ON THE 
STATE OF MISS RICHARDS' PHYSICAL OR MENTAL 
HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE 
·CODICIL AND THE EVIDENCE SO ADDUCED SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN. 
The hypothetical questions asked Dr. Currier 'Yere 
not based on his personal observation. The questions 
were predicated on isolated rircun1stanres taken fro1n the 
hear8a.~ .. contained in the hospital records and upon the 
case history and opinions of others. Dr. Currier's testi-
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mony \vas highly conjectural, speculative and uncertain. 
Substantially every answer that he gave was qualified and 
upon close scrutiny will, we believe, be found to have no 
probative value. The Wyoming case of In Re Nelson's 
Estate, 266 P. 2d 238, at page 260, analyzes such testi-
mony. and states that the questions propounded to the 
expert should be complete and intelligible, should not 
be misleading and should not be framed so as to call for 
speculation or conjecture. As the trial court stated in 
the Wyoming case the opinion of the doctor must be 
based upon vvhat the evidence is and "should be tied 
down." 
Counsel, over objection, indulged in a line of ques-
tioning of which the following is an example: 
"Q. You assume, Doctor, a heart in the condition 
that I am about to describe. The left dia-
phragm is slightly elevated. A minimal 
amount of pleural thickening or fluid is 
present in the base of the left chest. Because 
of the magnification produced by the port-
able technique, accurate n1easurement of the 
heart cannot be made. However, the heart 
appears grossly enlarged with the apex al-
most reaching the lateral chest wall. The 
pulmonary markings are generally prominent. 
The lungs are clear. 
Now, Doctor, you assume a heart in that 
condition. Tell us how that would affect the 
supply of blood to the brain. 
1\tiR. GUSTIN: Now, before you answer 
that, I think that counsel will agree that his 
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question is based upon a situation that is 
described in the hospital reports under date 
of May 24, 1954. 
MR. BAGLEY: Correct 
MR. GUSTIN: All right, Your Honor, 
we object to the question on the ground that 
it would not tend to prove nor disprove any 
of the issues in this case, and it is too remote. 
THE COURT : Let me ask of the wit-
ness, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to 
how the patient might be affected by such a 
heart~ 
A. Yes sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And tell me this, would 
there be in your opinion any particular 
change possible or likely within a period of 
a month thereafter~ 
A. Not in the condition of the heart, no sir. 
THE COlTRT: The objection then is 
overruled, and you n1ay answer the question. 
A. 'V e 11, an enlarged heart is an inefficient 
heart. It doesn't pump blood as ''rell. There-
fore, one would expect that there would be 
some interference "\nth the integrity of the 
circulation of blood throughout the systen1, 
which would include the brain; and the brain 
being the part of the body 1nost vulnerable 
to difficulties of circulation, one u;ould ex-
pect that it 1night have some influence on the 
clarity of the thinking." (Tr. 312-313). 
(Emphasis added). 
The foregoing, so far as "clarityH of thinking is con-
cerned, has absolutely no relationship to l\Iiss Richards' 
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state of n1ind on June 25th, nor does it have any proba-
tive value in the face of the positive testimony of Mr. 
~1ortensen and the subscribing witnesses at the time of 
execution of the codicil. The above is based upon the 
conclusions of others as found in the hospital reports 
and case history. To permit such testimony is pre-
judicial and clearly erroneous. The subject is extensively 
annotated at 98 A.L.R. 1109 following the case of Mt. 
Royal Cab Co. v. Dolan, 179 A. 54 (Md.), 98 A.L.R. 1106, 
where it is stated generally that the opinion of an expert 
witness must rest upon the facts rather than upon the 
opinions, inferences or conclusions of others. The an-
notation calls attention to the ~Iaryland case of Coughlin 
v. Cuddy, 96 A. 869, where, in a will contest to deter-
mine the sanity of the testator, testimony obtained upon 
a hypothetical question propounded to expert witnesses 
and containing conclusions, opinions and inferences of 
preceding witnesses was properly excluded, and to the 
case of Mt. Royal Cab Co. v. Dolan, supra, holding that 
opinions and conclusions may not be predicated upon the 
opinions and conclusions of other witnesses or upon con-
flicting testimony that is material to the issue. 
The 1955 Cumulative Supplement to Volume 20 
Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1211.1, states: 
"It appears to be well settled that medical 
testimony as to the possibility of a causal rela-
tion between a given accident or injury and the 
subsequent death or impaired physical or mental 
condition of the person injured is not sufficient, 
standing alone, to establish such relation. By 
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testimony as to possibility is meant testimony in 
which the witness asserts that the accident or 
injury 'might have,' 'may have,' or 'could have' 
caused, or 'possibly did' cause the subsequent 
physical condition or death or that a given phy-
sical condition (or death) 'might have,' 'may 
have,' or 'could have' resulted or 'possibly did' 
result from a previous accident or injury-testi-
mony, that is, which is confined to words indicat-
ing the possibility or chance of the existence of 
the causal relation in question and does not in-
clude words indicating the probability or likeli-
hood of its existence." (En1phasis added). 
Dr. Currier's ans\Yers \Vere qualified by words "one 
would expect" (Tr. 313), "I would expect" (Tr. 318), 
"I suppose you might say" (Tr. 318), and "it would seem 
to 1ne highly unlikely" (Tr. 319). These answers and 
other similar ren1arks of Dr. Currier were made the 
subject of n1otions to strike and come under the rule 
contended for abo\~e, as W'"ell as the state1nent contained 
in 20 .A nl. Jur .. EYidence, Section 1206, page 1056: 
"Positive expert testin1ony will prevail over 
negative expert testin1ony. ~· 
The !\fontana court in the rase of J:elley r. Cable 
Co., 20 P. 669, held that so-ealled expert opinion has no 
valu0 as against the positiYe, corroborated and uncon-
tradicted te~tin1ony of uni1npeaehed \ritnesses to a fact. 
·ThP Montana rourt said: 
'•The dictates of intellectual belief are as 
inlpPrious as those of conscience***." 
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Objection was made to the hypothetical question which 
starts at line 17 on page 314 of the record. The o bjec-
tion to the question is found on page 317 of the record and 
was to the effect that the question would tend to contradict 
and i1npeach the te~<Einiony of Dr. Galligan, who was 
called as a witness for the contestants; that the question 
misstates and distorts the record as to the physical condi-
tion that existed at the time of the signing of the in-
strument; that the question does not include the known 
factors as shown by the record which makes the ques-
tion incomplete, irrevelant and immaterial, and for the 
further objection that a proper foundation had not been 
laid for the answer. The italicized portions of the ques-
tion are the portions particularly vulnerable to the ob-
jections. The question reads: 
"Q. Now, Doctor, assume that you have an un-
married female person seventy-eight years 
of age with chronic arteriosclerosis or harden-
ing of the arteries that is observable upon 
pressttre of th1e veins and having a heart in 
the condition which I have described to you 
previously and having suffered from diabetes 
for a period of five or six years prior to Jun.e 
25, 1954, and that this heart condition has 
reached the point where it results in uncom-
pensated heart failure; that the person is 
admitted to a hospital on the 21st day of 
May in a very-or very seriously ill. She 
has a history of treatment of the heart by 
digitalis. She, as I have stated, is suffering 
also from diabetes, which is out of control, 
that is, it cannot be controlled by the ap-
proved methods of treatment of diabetes by 
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a skilled and experienced physician and with 
all of the facilities that are available in an 
ordinary hospital. Assume that the doctor 
is unable to control that diabetes from the 
time she entered the hospital, from May 21 
up to and including the 25th of June, both of 
1954; that the patient during that period that 
I have described while she is in the hospital 
fluctuated between diabetic acidosis and in-
sulin shock, even though continuous atten-
tion is paid to the urinary sugar and blood 
sugar. Assume further that the heart con-
tinues to deteriorate; that it results in the 
presence of fluid in the lungs, which is pre-
sent most of that period. Assume also that 
the patient is unable to control the bowel 
movements; that she is unable to eat or take 
solid food except very slightly; that she grows 
continuously weaker from the date of her 
admission to the hospital up to and including 
the 25th da~~ of June; that about a week 
prior to the date of her death on June 30 
there is a marked decline in her conditi.on. 
All of those sympton1s that I have described 
suddenly for about a' 1£eek before her death 
becon~e 1nore aggra cated. and she is nau-
seated frequently during this stay in the hos-
pital. She does a great deal, of vomiting. She 
has to be fed intervenously~ and liquids have 
to be administered intervenousl~~; that she 
falls out of bed and bruises her forehead; 
that she is sen.t"le. 
I will ask you, Doctor-oh~ I "~ant to add 
one further factor. She suffet·s front short-
ness of breath. and she has to have o~ryge·n 
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administered to her during this stay in the 
hospital. Now, she dies on the 30th day of 
June. 
Do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to 
what the mental capacity of a person in that 
condition was say on June 25, 1954~" (Tr. 
314-315). (Emphasis added). 
The question injects Currier's definition of senility. 
There was no evidence that Miss Richards was senile 
that would in any way reflect on her mental competency 
on June 25th. In fact her mind was clear, she was 
oriented and had a full understanding of what she was 
doing and, in the words of the subscribing witnesses, she 
was of sound and disposing mind and memory. In the 
words of Dr. Galligan Miss Richards was competent if 
not asleep or in a coma. A condition of insulin shock 
or diabetic coma could have been recognized by the sub-
scribing witnesses. Dr. Copeland would not have in-
jected the needle for the intravenous feeding if Miss 
Richards was in shock or coma, and certainly he would 
not have done so if she was fluctuating between diabetic 
acidosis and insulin shock. The diabetic condition was in 
control at the time of the execution of the codicil other-
wise the diabetic would have been in shock or com.a. 
There in no evidence that at the time of the execution of 
the codicil the heart had deteriorated to the point where 
there was fluid in the lungs. There is no evidence that 
Miss Richards at the time of the execution of the codicil 
\Vas unable to control bowel movements, or that she was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
nauseated or that she was vomiting or that she was 
falling out of bed or that oxygen was being administered. 
These are but a few of the glaring distortions of the 
record. 
The question seeks to 1nake capital out of Dr. Cope-
land's observations and conclusions made between 8:00 
and 9:00 o'clock in the morning of June 25th as reflected 
in his progress report of that day; on the alleged con-
dition of "uncompensated heart failure" and that she 
"fluctuates between diabetic acidosis and insulin shock" 
-mere opinions of Copeland several hours removed 
fron1 the event under inquiry. The question contains 
no reference to the conversation between Miss Richards 
and the subscribing \Yitnesses, nor to the statement that 
1\Iiss Richards made to Dr. Copeland: "I have some 
important business "~ith these gentlemen, I wish that 
you could do that later (the intravenous feeding) and 
I rould proceed ,,~ith this business," nor to Dr. Cope-
land's staten1ent: "She \Yill be fixed up in a few minutes 
and you can con1e back." The in1propriety of the ques-
tion and its unfair and distorted prenrise is readily 
di seernihle "Then one conten1plates the uncontradicted, 
unilnpeached testiinony or t\\TO experienced business Inen, 
a reputable la"Tyer and the patient~s attending physirian 
,rhosr con1petenc:T and integrity is not questioned. 
Dr. Currier's ans,rer~ and \Yhich the court refused 
to strike ( Tr. 319), is characteristic of his other answers. 
i I P l1as no opinion. llis O\\Tn conjecture, uncertainty and 
sp<'enlation i~ rrflected by the ans\rer itself: 
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"A. Well, my opinion is that she is fighting a 
very difficult battle to maintain her clarity 
of thinking. I would expect that a person be-
tween diabetic acidosis and insulin shock 
would probably be in some state of confusion 
and perhaps disorientation, at least some of 
the time. How much wo~tld depend entirely 
upon the severity of swings from one side to 
the other, because that is what happens, with 
coma being the end result on either side for 
opposite reasons. 
I suppose you might say it is like a per-
son walking along a very treacherous narrow 
pathway between a mountain precipice on 
one side and a roaring river on the other 
side. It is very difficult to stay on the path. 
If you deviate either way a little bit, you 
are likely to be in very serious trouble. *** 
It would seem to me highly unlikely that a 
person in this medical situation would be in 
a state of mind to make any decision of last-
ing or serious importance." (Tr. 318-319) 
(Emphasis added). 
If ever there was a case where a so-called expert 
arrogated to himself the function of the jury by im-
perious statement, not even limited by conscience, it is 
the testimony of Dr. Currier in the instant matter. 
~ 
POINT 4. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER WAS 
UNDULY RESTRICTED. 
·~t Had Dr. Currier been given the opportunity he might W, 
have readily conceded that his theory and speculation 
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were of no value objectively so far as Miss Richards 
was concerned. In an attempt to test the credibility of 
the witness and the extent his imperious ego prevailed, 
the court erroneously, we believe, cut off that avenue of 
cross-examination. 
"Q. In this case do you imply that your judgment 
of this situation or your opinion in any area 
that you have been permitted to state your 
opinion might be better than the attending 
physician who knew and treated l\fiss 
Richards? 
MR. BAGLEY: I object to that, Your 
Honor, as asking for a comparison of opin-
Ions. 
THE COlTRT: The objection is sus-
tained, and you "\Youldn't need to weigh your 
testimony against others. The jury will do 
that." ( Tr. 338). 
Dr. Galligan and Dr. Currier "\Yere not testif)ing on the 
same level. Dr. Galligan "~as the attending physician. 
Dr. Currier "~as testifying fron1 hospital charts and as 
a total ~tranger to the personality of :Jiiss Riehards. 
Ordinarily the la"T takes a practical, common sense view 
of things and certainly cross-exan1ination is calculated 
to that end. We do not haYe the orthodox situation of 
asking one 'vi tness to "Teigh his testilnony as against 
another. "\V.P have a very realistic and down to earth 
situation of giving a 'vitness an opportunity to be fair 
,vith hi1nself and 'vith the subject of the inquiry. Per-
haps Dr. Currier "Tould readily have conceded that he 
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was not in the same position as Dr. Galligan to pass 
upon the mental fitness of Miss Richards. Perhaps he 
"vould have said that his knowledge was superior to 
that of Dr. Galligan and, if the latter, then the trier of 
the fact might have been persuaded that such reflected 
upon credibility. 'V e submit that phychiatric testimony 
has no place in this case, but if it did have a place the 
trial court did not permit us to even scratch the sur-
face on the general concept of credibility. 
POINT 5. 
THE CONTESTANTS HAD THE BURDEN TO SHOW 
INCOMPETENCY AND THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SO INSTRU·CTED. 
Contestants conceded that they had the burden of 
showing a lack of testamentary capacity and that the 
burden of proof on that issue was theirs. It was upon 
that theory that the contestants were given the right 
to open and close the argument (Tr. 423-424). Excep-
tions to the complete and total omission from the in-
structions given to the jury as to the burden of proof 
on the issue of testamentary capacity were duly taken 
(Tr. 434). 
In Re Buttars' Estate,_ ___________ Utah ____________ , 261 P. 2d 
171, decided in 1953 relying on In Re Hansen's Will, 50 
Utah 207, 167 P. 256, held that after the testimony of 
the t"-'O witnesses to the will, one of whom was the at-
torney who drew the same and the other his secretary, 
the contestants had the burden to prove by a preponder-
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ance of evidence that the testatrix did not have a sound 
and disposing mind at the time she executed the will, this 
Court stating: 
"By this evidence the proponents made out 
a prima facie case entitling the Will to be ad-
mitted to probate and it then became incumbent 
on the contestants to prove by a preponderance 
of evidence that the testatrix did not have a sound 
and disposing mind at the tune she executed the 
Will or that she was acting under fraud, menace 
or undue influence." 
The codicil in the instant case "\vas offered for pro-
bate with the will of ~larch 20, 1946 (Tr. 1-4). The will 
\Y'as ad1nitted 'vithout prejudice to the adrnission to pro-
bate of the codicil (Tr. 8-11). Therefore the situation is 
the same as in the Buttars case and the rule announced 
in Re Han sen's TVill. supra, to the effect that the bur-
ren of proof rests upon hin1 'vho makes the allegation 
and he 1nust establish the fact of insanity b:~ a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 
I r:.. 3 A J T . 1 R t. ... -6 .... ')Q . j_ • n n Jn. ur.. r1a ~ ~ec 1on bt , page n..., , It IS 
said: 
"The parties to a ciYil action are entitled to 
have the jury instructed as to the party "~ho has 
the burden of proof on a specific issue raised by 
the pleadings and n1aintained at the trial, and 
to have the court properly define and explain 
"~hat is neePf'sar~ .. to sustain that burden." 
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A failure to correctly i11struct the jury on the burden 
of proof brought about a reversal in the case of John 
Ainsfield Co. v. Rasmussen, 30 Utah 453, 85 P. 1002. 
But regardless of the court's failure to instruct on 
the burden of proof, particularly under what to sorne 
may appear an extreme liberalizing of concepts of pro-
cedure under our new Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
evidence, if any, adduced by the contestants must be 
weighed consistent with the rules announced in the 
Butters case and In Re Hansen's Will, which leads us to 
the next point. 
POINT 6 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S FINDING. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
ADMITTED THE CODICIL TO PROBATE NOTWITHST'AND-
IND THE VERDICT. 
The decisive question in this case is whether there 
is any competent evidence in the record to support the 
jury finding of lack of testamentary capacity. It is sub-
mitted that Dr. Currier's testimony, based as it is upon 
conjecture, surmise, speculation and half truths taken 
from the hospital records and the sketchy conclusions and 
isolated statements of others, is no evidence at all and 
should be totally disregarded. Even though the ex-
pressions of Currier be considered by this Court as 
properly in the record, still there remains the question 
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as to whether on the overall consideration of the entire 
case reasonable minds could differ as to the integrity of 
the testamentary act of the decedent. 
We do not have to go so far, we believe, as to say 
that Currier's testimony must be ruled out before it 
can be said that a directed verdict in favor of the pro-
ponent of the codicil should have been granted, because 
we say that Currier, by l1is own vacillation and lack of 
responsible opinion, and not having seen !fiss Richards, 
as opposed to the personal observation and uncontra-
dicted testimony of those who were present at and wit-
nessed the execution of the codicil, and as opposed to 
the opinion of the attending physician, has no efficacy 
in the record. We would, however, like to have this 
Court express its disapproval of the attempt by counsel 
in this and future cases to make a jury ease by injecting 
son1ething as abstract and indefinable as the vagaries of 
Currier. ''r e "~ould like it said that one operating in the 
nebulous field of psychiatry can not speak authoritatively 
on the strength or 'veakness of the hun1an n1ind by the con-
tents of a bed pan. '':--e n1ust lea,~e~ ho,vever, the criticis1n 
of such trial technique, if one is n1erited, to the more 
nrtieulate expression. of this Court, 'vhose duty it is to 
detern1ine the propt:fy of judicial inquiry and its suf-
fieiPnr~r to place litigants in their proper relative posi-
tions of right or 'vrong 'Yithin the structure of the law. 
The' previous decisions of this Court have carefully 
eon~ idPr('d the "~eight and sufficiency of the evidence 
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whenever the integrity of a testamentary document has 
been involved. In Re Lavelle's Estate,------------Utah ____________ , 
2-!8 P. 2d 372, due allowance was made for Mrs. Lavelle's 
age and poor physical condition so as to determine the 
amount of influence necessary to overcome the will of 
the testatrix and cited with approval In Re Bryan's 
Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602. In both cases the 
will was upheld. In the instant case an extreme and 
unwarranted assertion of undue influence was made by 
the pleadings but screened out by the trial court when 
it became apparent that the evidence could not even 
ren1otely support such assertion. We mention the undue 
influence allegation as reflecting upon the weakness of 
contestants' position. They even went so far as to es-
sert that the signature on the codicil was not that of 
Miss Richards. They failed to support the contention 
of undue influence and the assertion that the signature 
was not that of the testatrix, and as their final resort 
they rely on the nebulous testimony of Dr. Currier in 
their attempt to show a mental infirmity. 
In the Lavelle case, Mrs. Lavelle was a bedridden 
invalid, paralyzed on her left side by a series of strokes, 
suffering fron1 certain kidney and urinary disorders, 
at the same time sustaining an illicit relationship with 
one of the benefactors of her will. 
In Re Goldsberry's Estate, 95 Utah 379,81 P. 2d 1106, 
'vas a case centered around alleged duress and undue 
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influence. The testatrix was eighty-five years of age, 
was infirm and unable to take care of herself. The Court 
said: 
"She was physically feeble, but alert men-
tally. The undue influence in this case, if any, 
was applied apparently not to a weak but to a 
rather strong mind." 
Currier's testimony in the instant case would have us 
say that physical and mental deterioration run hand ill 
hand. 'l,here are 1nany elderly people who demonstrate 
the fallacy of such contention whether coming from a 
phychiatrist or not. Dr. Galligan testified that 1\Iiss 
Richards' jllness did not affect her mental capacity. 
In Re Bryan-'s Estate, supra, the contestant lost out 
on both grounds of undue influence and alleged lack of-
testamentary capaeity on a non-suit and dismissal. 
Bryan "~as in the hospital suffering fron1 cancer and had 
,iuRt undergone a 1najor operation. He wished to make 
disposition of his property. H·ypodern1ics of morphine 
"Trre given every four hours to relie\e pain and in the 
prevention of peritonitis. It ,,~as testified that such 
dosage would not rob an ordinary 1nan of his faculties 
and the attending physician said that so far as he 
observed it had no effect on the In ental faculties of the 
patient. It "Tas held that the burden of proof is on con-
tPstant to sho"T 1nental incapacity and undue influence 
and that the proponent could 111eet this with proof of a 
negative, that is, that he did not procure the execution 
of t lH' "Till b~T undue influence and that the testator \vas 
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not n1entally incapable. ~~ otwithstanding the operation, 
the fact that the testator was in the hospital, that he was 
thin and worn froin disease at the time of the execution 
of the will, this Court concluded that the testator was 
at the time of the making of the will of sound mind. The 
scrivener was a lawyer who· went to the hospital in re-
sponse to a telephone call. The Court said: 
"Mr. Douglas is a lawyer of repute and many 
years' experience. Not anything is made to ap-
pear that would indicate he was hostile, pre-
judiced, or biased. His testimony is unimpeached. 
He testified he talked with Bryan for half an 
hour before drawing the will, and after it was 
drawn he read it to the sick man, holding the 
"\vill in front of him so that he was able to follow 
the reading with his eyes; that the will was read 
a second time to him in the presence of the sub-
scribing witnesses, one of whom was a nurse, and 
the other the interne at the hospital. The manner 
and substance of the conversation, the circum-
stances of the drawing and executing of the will, 
strongly show that Bryan "\vas acting of his own 
free will without suggestion or coercion of any 
kind." 
This Court in its overall conclusion held that there was 
not sufficient evidence adduced by the contestant to take 
the case to the jury or to support a verdict as against 
the will had such a verdict been rendered. 
In Re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 P. 15, decided 
In 1927, presented both undue influence and lack of 
testa1nentary capacity. This Court held that, notwithstand-
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1ng the unnatural conduct of Ford, there was no sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the verdict as far as con-
cerned the charge that Ford at the time of the execu-
tion of his will was not of sound and disposing mind. 
In Re Hansen's Will, supra, the evidence was di-
rected almost entirely to the testator's sanity. The testa-
tor was seventy-nine years of age when the will was 
made. The testimony of the scrivener and the other 
subscribing witnesses respecting the mental capacity of 
the testator 'vas clear and convincing. The Court held 
that the inquiry as to testamentary capacity should be 
limited to a period of time not too remote to the execu-
tion of the document. 
In the instant case it was sho"'"ll that the disease of 
diabetes works dran1atically. There is a small differ-: 
ence bet"Teen the tune in ,,~hich there can be an onset 
of ro1na or the adn1inistration of insulin and within the 
period insulin is given, or "they get" an excess of in-
sulin. It is a bizarre disease (Tr. 288), and a person in 
diabetic con1a or insulin shock evidences a condition 
that would be startling to a lay1nan and one which he 
could readil~T detect (Tr. 285-286). Dr. Galligan's testi-
nlony is that J\Iiss Richards, if not in insulin shock or in 
diab0tic con1a, could function ( Tr. 285) and "Tas compe-
tent to conduct her affairs (Tr. 2S~). The inquiry, there-
fore, i~ ~[iss R.ichards' 1nental health at about 2:30 o'clock 
on the aftrrnoon of June 25th, the time 'vhen she executed 
the codieil, and at \vhich tin1e, according to the testimony 
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of Messrs. Jones, C.arlson, ~{ortensen and Dr. Copeland, 
she was not in diabetic coma or insulin shock, and to 
this there is no dispute in the record. 
In the Ii ansen case, supra, the fact that the testator 
was considered unlike other men, that there were ec-
centricities aggravated by the physical infirmities of 
being deaf, of having some ailment of the throat and 
eyes, were cast aside by this Court with the expression 
that "however gross" they do not constitute insanity and 
cannot incapacitate one otherwise sound for making a 
valid will. 
In the Buttars' Estate case, supra, the will was 
admitted to probate notwithstanding a jury's verdict 
finding that the testatrix did not have a sound and dis-
posing mind at the time of executing the will. This Court 
held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain con-
testants' burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity 
on the part of the testatrix at the time of making the 
will. Mrs. Buttars was approximately eighty years of 
age, with a history of serious and extended illness and 
many idiosyncrasies. The Court held: 
"The evidence related above is proof that 
testatrix was eccentric in her actions and forget-
ful at times of some things, but is utterly insuffi-
cient to sustain the contestants' burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
she lacked testamentary capacity at the time she 
executed the Will. This j s especially so in view 
of the positive testimoney of the subscribing wit-
nesses that she appeared to know what she was 
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doing at that time and that she was alone with 
the lawyer when she made her wishes known, 
since the Will itself shows she remembered who 
were 'the natural objects of her bounty' and that 
she disposed of her property 'understandingly 
according to some plan formed in her mind.' 
There being no question of fraud or undue in-
fluence in the formulating and relation of that 
plan to the lawyer, the mere fact that at times 
she was forgetful and eccentric and was weak 
physically and that after she made her Will she 
disposed of a good portion of her property after 
a lifetime of careful saving is no proof that at 
the time of making her Will she lacked testament-
ary capacity. The court therefore did not err in 
admitting the \V"ill to probate in view of the 
complete lack of evidence that at the time of 
making the Will testatrix lacked the mind to 
understand ".,.hat she 'Yas doing." 
In the case of Rose r. Foster (Old.), 288 P. 2d 745 
( 1955), the decedent "~as an elderly lady afflicted with 
son1e ph~Tsical disability~ i.e.~ angina pectoris and Parkin-
son syndrome, "Thich disability seemed to progress ·with 
age. She "Tas n1entally alert and the "~ll 'Yas drawn by 
an attorne~~ according to her instructions. The Court 
said: 
"It has been held 1nanY tunes that advanced 
age or physical infir1nity ~.lone does not render 
one incapable of n1aking a will." 
In the Oklnho1na case of Brou·n r. Broten, 28'7 P. 2d 
D 13 ( ln~'lG), it "Tas held that evidence of a testator's 
ailing or \YPnkened physical condition is not proof in 
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itself of his testamentary incapacity; that in order to con-
stitute such proof the condition must be shown to have 
rendered him incapable of understanding the nature and 
consequences of his acts at the time he made the will. 
The Court calls attention to counsel's adroit attempt to 
show that the testator's paralytic condition made him 
agreeable to anything that was suggested to him, but 
that such attempt, when uncolored and "unclothed with 
inference as they are portrayed in counsel's brief," was 
unconvincing. In the instant case there is nothing but 
age, a sick woman and Currier for the contestants to rely 
upon. We have disposed of Currier and there leaves the 
alert mind of an elderly and sick woman but not too ill 
to say that she had made a mistake in her will and to 
direct the rectifying of the same. 
There is no competent evidence in the record that 
reflects upon the integrity of what was done when ~liss 
Richards executed her codicil on the 25th of June, 1954, 
in the presence of Messrs. Jones, Carlson and Morten .. 
sen. At that time not only was she under the careful 
observation of those men who witnessed the instrument, 
but she was, by virtue of all the hospital attendance and 
service ordered by her attending physician and interne, 
also, in effect, under the surveillance of doctors. If in-
deed Miss Richards had lacked testamentary competence, 
certainly some one of these highly competent and in-
disputedly honorable men would have said so in voice 
louder and clearer than the feeble, vacillating, uncertain 
\vhispers of Dr. Currier, who never saw or treated Miss 
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Richards, and whose testimony is altogether without 
force and probative value. Reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the proposition that Miss Richards was not 
in diabetic coma or insulin shock, or even approaching 
those two extremes when the codicil was executed and 
the intravenous feeding commenced. The experienced 
witnesses to the document would have readily ascertained 
such condition if one in fact existed, and without such 
condition being present Miss Richards could function 
and was competent by the testimony of Dr. Galligan. 
Those who had the burden of showing incompetency 
have failed to sustain it ; they do not contradict the 
testimony or reflect upon the credibility of Messrs. Jones, 
Carlson, ~Iortensen and Dr. Galligan by anything that 
to the reasonable mind \vould be considered evidenee of 
probative value. 
The judg1nent of the trial court should be reversed 
and the cause remanded "~ith instructions to admit the 
codicil to probate consistent with the motion for directed J 
verdict ( Tr. 426) and the n1otion 1nade for judgn1ent 
notwithstanding the verdict (Tr. 7 4). 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & ~IATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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